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SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE FIELD OF AVIATION LAW
CARROLL E. DuBuc*
I. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY INVOLVING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
T HE PERIOD beginning March 1, 1978 was one of substantial
activity in Congress in the field of products liability legislation.
Numerous bills were introduced in the House of Representatives
and the Senate dealing with one or more aspects of the products
liability problem. Several of these focused particularly on the
products liability problem as it relates specifically to the aviation
industry. As will be more fully discussed below, none of these bills
seeking to create a federal law of products liability were enacted
in the Ninety-Fifth Congress and, therefore, the only positive ac-
complishment of that Congress in the field of products liability
came about as the result of a new section added to the Internal
Revenue Code.' Furthermore, with the changes in Congress as a
result of the November elections, the potential for the enactment
of some of the proposed bills may be difficult to assess.
Much of the legislative effort was engendered by the Final Re-
port of the Interagency Task Force on Products Liability, issued
on November 1, 1977.' This report represented the culmination
of approximately eighteen months of investigation of the products
liability dilemma facing American manufacturers and insurers.
Among the suggested causes of the dilemma were liability insur-
ance rate-making procedures, manufacturing practices, and un-
* Resident Partner, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, Washington, D.C. The
assistance of my associates, Temple L. Ratcliffe and John J. Connors, in the
preparation of this paper is gratefully acknowledged.
I Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 371, 92 Stat. 2859 (amending
I.R.C. § 371).
2U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LiAmrrY,
F NAL REPORT, NTIS, P.B.-273-220 (1977).
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certainties in the tort-litigation system.' This third underlying cause,
uncertainties in the tort-litigation system, was the subject of much
of the Task Force's Report. The Report was used by the Carter
administration in proposing the sole bill which was enacted into
law by the Ninety-Fifth Congress in the area of product liability.
A. Internal Revenue Code Amendment
Following the release of the Task Force's Final Report, a total
of twenty-nine separate bills were introduced in the House." The
thrust of each of these bills was to provide for a tax deduction for
amounts set aside in a trust fund to meet product liability losses.
Although the bills differed in some technical aspects, the primary
thrust of each was to create a tax free trust fund to be used to pay
product liability losses. In addition, each bill contained a definition
of "product liability loss." None of these twenty-nine bills were ever
passed, although a similar concept was engrafted into the Internal
Revenue Code in the following manner.
On October 9, 1978, during the consideration of H.R. 13511,
the "Revenue Act of 1978," an amendment was considered and
adopted to permit an additional carry-back period of seven years
for excessive operating losses attributable to product liability
losses.' In simplistic terms, the new section permits a product
liability loss to be carried back up to ten years preceding the
date on which the loss is incurred." Product liability loss is defined
as a loss attributable to:
[L]iability for damages on account of physical injury or emotional
harm to individuals, or damage to or loss of use of property, on
account of the manufacture, importation, distribution, lease or
sale by the taxpayer of any product if such liability arises after
3 Id. at xxxix-lvi. This Report also led to the publication of a Model Uni-
form Products Liability Law, discussed at notes 113-144 infra.
IH.R. 7711, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (identical bills, H.R. 8023, 8024,
8339, 8537, 8885, 8918, 9790, 10649, 11502, 12607, and 13764); H.R. 8064
(identical and similar bills, H.R. 8876, 8877, 9156, 9394, 10196 and 11336);
H.R. 10272 (identical and similar bills, H.R. 10675, 11378, 11788, 12471, 12474,
13210 and 13212); and H.R. 12429 (identical bill, H.R. 13260).
1 H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S17,771 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1978).
1 H. CONF. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1978).
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the taxpayer has completed or terminated operations with respect
to, or has relinquished possession of, such product!
Therefore, this relief would not apply to medical malpractice or
other "service" related losses. The amendment was adopted by
the House-Senate Conference Committee and became Section 371
of Public Law 95-600.' The loss carry-back amendment does not
become effective until taxable years beginning after September 30,
1979.' This legislation and other proposed legislation dealing with
favorable tax treatment to manufacturers for product liability re-
serves may have a profound effect on the pattern of product lia-
bility insurance in the future.
B. Product Liability "Reform" Legislation
(1) Legislation Proposed at the Federal level.
Of the bills considered at the federal level, all were introduced
prior to March 1, 1978, the date which was to be the beginning
for the period covered by this article. However, all were considered
during this period. Although none of these bills were enacted, they
are nonetheless important because they reflect a growing concern
among the members of the Congress with the general problem of
products liability.
The first bill is S. 403, entitled the "National Product Liability
Insurance Act."1 The bill would have created a National Product
Liability Insurance Administration to administer a joint underwrit-
ing authority to provide product liability reinsurance to manufac-
turers, issue federal charters to captive insurance companies, and
review federal and state product liability arbitration established un-
der other provisions of the Act.11 A captive insurance company was
defined as one which is organized to provide insurance or reinsur-
ance limited to the potential liabilities of the member organizations
of the association or parent, its subsidiaries and associated or
7 H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S17,771 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 1978).
8 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 371, 92 Stat. 2859 (amending
I.R.C. S 371).
'Id., 92 Stat. at 2860.
0S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. SI,185 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1977) (introduced by Sen. James B. Pearson, (R-Kan.)).
" Id. tit. II, 123 CONG. REC. at S1,197.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
affiliated companies." The Administrator of the National Product
Liability Insurance Administration would have been authorized
to contractually agree to provide reinsurance for product liability
coverage based on the payment of certain premiums and/or fees."
Additionally, the Administrator would have been empowered to
disseminate information to the public concerning product liability
insurance and other product liability information." The National
Product Arbitration Program which would have been established
under the Act would have created a product liability arbitration
panel in each judicial district of the United States." Each panel
would have arbitrated all product liability actions in that District
and would have been composed of an attorney with at least two
years' experience, a physician, and a third non-attorney, non-
physician member." The arbitration would have been binding, but
a party could, within ten days after the service of the last pleading,
file a demand for a trial by jury, and the matter would not have
been arbitrated." States were to be encouraged to set up a similar
arbitration plan and, in addition, to comply with the national
standards for product liability arbitration programs." These
standards would have included the following: the defense of com-
pliance with all federal and state laws concerning the manufacture
of the product; the defense of compliance with the "state of the
art," defined as conforming to the highest recognized and pre-
vailing standard practices technically and economically feasible
in existence within the relevant industry at the time of manufac-
ture; the defense of misuse or modification of the product; only
arbitration was available if an action was commenced after the tenth
year from which the date on which the product was placed in
commerce; and finally, no damages could be recovered if the in-
juries were sustained after the reasonable, ordinary useful life of
the product." Finally, the bill would have established a Federal
12 1d. § 302(4), 123 CoNG. REC. at S1,198.
1 Id. § 301(a), 123 CONG. REC. at S1,198.
'
4 Id. S 307, 123 CONG. REc. at S1,199.
Id. §§ 401-402, 123 CONG. Rc. at S1,198.
I8 d. S 403, 123 CONG. REC. at S1,198.
I71d. § 405(b)-(c), 123 CoNG. REC. at S1,198.
,Id. tit. V.
"Id. tit. VI, 123 CoNG. REC. at S1,200.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Liability Compensation Fund to be administered in the Depart-
ment of the Treasury and used to satisfy any judgment which
the manufacturer/seller could not, without undue hardship, fully
satisfy within six months after the date of its rendering.' The bill
provided for periodic compensation payments from the liable
party.2
1
The second Senate bill, S. 1706, was titled the "Emergency
Product Liability Act '2 and was not nearly as sweeping in scope
as S. 403. The short-term solution proposed was to provide for
a two-year statute of limitations from the date of injury with a
seven-year outside period based on the date when the product was
first purchased." Secondly, the bill provided for an absolute de-
fense to an action based on a products liability theory if a sub-
stantial cause of the injury was an alteration or modification to
the product, made subsequent to the manufacturer's sale of the
product or misuse of the product." Finally, the bill provided its
own "state of the art" defense based on the generally recognized
prevailing state of the art applicable or relevant to the product
on the date it was manufactured.' Compliance with a generally
accepted practice could not have been used as a defense if it failed
to comply with any federal or state law prescribing relevant
standards applicable to the product." The Act would not have
applied to any claim based on alleged breach of warranty but
would have included those based on negligence or strict liability
in tort.1 The bill would have preempted any provision of state
law which was inconsistent with the foregoing defenses. Any state
law providing for less exposure to liability than the foregoing de-
fenses would not, however, have been preempted."' Any state could
have removed itself from the preemption provisions by passing
similar defenses and obtaining certification from the Secretary of
20Id. 5 606(a)-(b), 123 CONG. REC. at S1,200.
21 Id. § 606(c), 123 CoNG. REC. at S1,200.
IS. 1706, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. S10,028 (daily ed. June
16, 1977).





28 Id. 5 301.
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Commerce. Once such an exemption had been granted, the Act
would have had no further applicability to the state so exempted
regardless of whether that state subsequently modified or repealed
the state statutes on which the exemption was premised."
In the House of Representatives, three bills were introduced,
two of which dealt specifically with the problem of aviation acci-
dents. The first of these was H.R. 7298, entitled the "Air Travel
Protection Act of 1977."' The bill would have amended the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958," and essentially created a no-fault
insurance system which would pay benefits to the survivors of
persons killed, or persons injured, in major airline accidents.'
The bill coined the term "extraordinary aircraft occurrence" and
defined it as any aircraft accident which results in the death or
hospitalization of five or more persons or will probably result in
$2,500,000 or more in damages to any one person, $5,000,000
in damages in the aggregate, or $5,000 or more as to each of fifty
or more persons (provided there is $1,000,000 or more of such
damages in the aggregate).' The bill would have given the Secre-
tary of Transportation the authority to require air carriers to carry
insurance and would have provided that the Secretary could pay
any amount in excess of insurance coverage.' The Secretary would
have been empowered to direct the air carriers to collect a sur-
charge on tickets to provide the funds to pay for the excess lia-
bility coverage.' The bill provided that immediate assistance pay-
ments could be made which would not constitute an admission of
liability but would operate as a satisfaction, to the extent thereof,
to any final settlement or judgment.'
The bill went on to provide that any defense based on the con-
duct of a passenger or the fault of the air carriers would be waived,
as well as any defense based on charitable or governmental immu-
29 Id. § 302.
095th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H4,705 (daily ed. May 18, 1977)
(introduced by Rep. Glenn M. Anderson (D-Cal.)).
",72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976).
'2 H.R. 7298, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H4,705 (daily ed. May
18, 1977).





nity, including the immunity of the Federal Government, and a
two-year statute of limitations would have been created.' Defenses
based on failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages and
intentional damages sustained by a claimant were provided. 8 Fed-
eral district courts were to be given original jurisdiction without
regard to diversity and venue was created in any district where
the occurrence took place, where the defendant resided or trans-
acted business, or where the plaintiff resided if the defendant was
not a resident of or did not transact business in the United States."
Automatic consideration by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation was provided.' The exclusive rules of recovery created
were fair and just compensation for economic detriment, consist-
ing of and limited to expenses, loss of income, replacement services,
and survivors' losses. Each of these terms was further defined and
the definition of each included a provision for the reduction of a
recovery to reflect other income and/or expenses. 1
The bill further provided that any recovery for economic loss
should be diminished by the amount of social security, workmen's
compensation, and all other benefits available from any govern-
ment because of the injury, unless the law creating the benefits
specifically made them excess or secondary to recovery under this
proposal. Additionally, any income tax savings attributable to
loss of earnings based on recoveries which were not taxable, to a
maximum of fifteen percent of lost income, would have been de-
ducted and any death recovery could not have included any non-
economic elements." Finally, there would have been no recovery
for exemplary or punitive damages.'
If the case were tried to a jury, there would have been a special
verdict itemizing each of the elements set forth above." Any judg-
ment could have been ordered to be paid in periodic payments.'
Additionally, any person who recovered could have also recovered
'7 Id. S 1404(a).
38 Id.
"Id. § 1404(b)(1).
41 Id. § 1404(b)(2).
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costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees, although
written notice as to the intention to claim such payments would
have been required.' Finally, the indemnitor would have had a
right of recourse for indemnity or contribution to the extent that
the air carrier would have had such a right. This right would have
been tried separately from any claim as to injury or loss as a result
of the accident. There would be no right of contribution for in-
demnity against the United States, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration itself or any of its employees."
The second bill dealing specifically with aviation incidents was
H.R. 10917, which was intended to amend Title 28 of the
United States Code and create a federal cause of action for,
and federal court procedures with respect to, aviation acci-
dents. " The bill would have created an exclusive federal remedy
for damages arising out of an aviation accident. " The bill included
several specific rules of law, which will be discussed below, but as
to those topics not addressed, the rule was to be the consensus of
courts of competent jurisdiction.' The federal common law of
aviation accidents was specifically to include the duty of highest
degree of care by a common carrier for the safety of its passengers."
The bill would have adopted the rule of comparative fault and
provided for a right of contribution between all parties who, if
sued separately, would have been liable for damages. This right of
contribution did not preclude the existence of a right of indemnity
if otherwise proper." Damages for the death of another were to be
for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse, chil-
dren, parents or dependent relatives." Recovery was to be appor-
tioned in accordance with the law of the place of the decedent's
domicile.' Damages for wrongful death specifically excluded pain
and suffering and specifically included pecuniary loss, defined as
- I d. 5 1404(f).
"
4Id. § 1405(a)-(b).
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H1,018 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1978)




5' Id. S 2752(a)(1)(A)-(B).
- Id. S 2752(b).
14 d. § 2752(c).
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including the loss of care, comfort and society.' The cause of action
would have been subject to a two-year statute of limitations as
would the claims for contribution and indemnity, with a ninety
day period of grace following the service of process." Concerning
workmen's compensation claims, the bill would have been inapplic-
able to the extent that it was inconsistent with workmen's com-
pensation laws but it attempted to provide for a remedy by a third
party against the employer, a situation not now generally practic-
able." The bill went on to provide in detail for the mechanics of
a trial and service of process."
Another bill, H.R. 11788," was among the twenty-nine bills
noted above as providing for some form of relief from product
liability losses by amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. The
bill, however, also provided for the establishment of a Federal
Insurance Commission to regulate all insurance companies doing
business in "commerce."" It also contained a title captioned
"Standards for State Product Liability Tort Litigation Act." 1 This
was an attempt to have the Congress prescribe standards to be
adopted by the various state legislatures in product liability mat-
ters. The bill further provided for a panel to review various state
laws and certify them as being in compliance with this Act." If
the commission were to determine that a state did not have an
"approved plan", the bill provided for an alternative plan which
would automatically be placed into effect in that state.' This plan
would have carried with it most of the provisions of the suggested
plan to be followed by the states" except that it would be broader
in that it would not be limited to bodily injuries.' The alternative
"no-fault plans" would have continued in effect in a state until
such time as it enacted a qualified, approved plan."
55Id. S 2752(d).
-Id. 5 2753(b).
57 Id. § 2754.
58 Id. § 2761-2764.
59 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REC. H2,360 (daily ed. March 22, 1978).
0 Id. tit. I.
61 Id. tit. HI.
61 Id. tit. II, subtit. C.
Id. S 202.
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Three other bills tangentially related to the area of products
liability were considered by the Ninety-Fifth Congress. All were
intended to significantly alter the traditional diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction in the federal district courts, and two would have
abolished it. The first of these, H.R. 9622, would have amended
the United States Code to abolish diversity of citizenship as a basis
for federal court jurisdiction." This would leave the federal courts
solely to serve the function of resolving "federal questions" under
the Constitution or laws of the United States. H.R. 9622 passed
the House of Representatives on February 28, 1978."8 The bill as
passed also raised the jurisdictional amount in the federal district
courts to $25,000. Subsequently, the Senate Subcommittee on the
Improvement in Judicial Machinery considered S. 2389,"9 which
is identical to H.R. 9622 passed by the House, and S. 2094,"
which would not have abolished diversity jurisdiction, but would
have prohibited a plaintiff from bringing an action in a federal
district court in the state in which he was a citizen. Neither of
these bills were ever reported out by the Subcommittee. The ques-
tion is obviously important to the aviation community, particularly
as it might impact on the ability to manage litigation arising out
of a large air disaster properly.
(2) Activity in the State Legislatures
Several states have enacted laws dealing with the question of
products liability generally since March 1, 1978. The highlights
of these laws will be set forth below grouped by the area of the law
which was affected.
Statute of Limitations"
Effective September 15, 1978, Arizona has a limitation period
1795th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. Hl1,222 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1977).
6695th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H1,569 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978).
'095th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S14,870 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1977).
71 Several other states had previously modified their statutes of limitations as
follows: Florida, twelve years from date of delivery, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2)
(West Supp. 1979); Idaho, two years from the date of occurrence, IDAHO CODE §
5-219(4) (1979); Kansas, two years from date of injury, or if not readily ascer-
tainable, not more than ten years from the date of the act, KAN. STAT. § 60-513(b)
(1976); North Carolina, injury deemed to have occurred when discovered, but
not more than ten years after last act, N.C. GEN. STAT. S 1-15(b) (1975);
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of two years after the cause of action arises,"' except that no
product liability action may be commenced later than twelve years
after the product was first sold for use or consumption. This twelve-
year outside limitation does not apply to actions based on negli-
gence or breach of an express warranty." A Georgia law, effec-
tive July 1, 1978, provides that no action may be commenced later
than ten years from the date of the sale of the product.' On June
1, 1978, Indiana put into force a two-year statute of limitations
from the date of the accrual of the cause of action with an absolute
period of ten years, measured from the date of the sale.' Kentucky,
on June 17, 1978, although not dealing directly with an absolute
prohibition on the commencement of an action, created a statutory
rebuttable presumption that the product was not defective if the
injury occurred either more than five years after the date of the
sale of the product or more than eight years after the date of the
manufacture of the product." On August 1, 1978, the statute of
limitations in Minnesota for actions based on strict liability be-
came four years. Additionally, notice of a possible claim must be
given to all persons against whom the claim is likely within six
months after the injured party enters into an attorney-client rela-
tionship concerning the claim."" Effective July 1, 1978, the statute
of limitations in Nebraska is four years from the date of the injury
with an outside period of ten years from the date of the sale of
the product. The statute does not apply to the Uniform Commercial
Code implied warranty provisions." South Dakota, effective July
1, 1978, has one of the shorter absolute periods which is six years
after the date of delivery to first purchaser or lessee." A Tennessee
law, effective the same date, made products liability actions sub-
Oregon, two years from date of injury, but not more than eight years from date of
first purchase, OR. REV. STAT. 30.905 (1977).
72 Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1978).
73 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1978).
74 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106(2) (1978).
7" IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns 1978).
7
1Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (1978).
77 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 738 (West). (Note: All unofficial citations
hereinafter provided are from material provided by the American Insurance
Association, New York, New York.)
"
8Neb. L.B. 665 (1978).
70S.D. H.B. 1116 (1978).
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ject to a six-year statute of limitations from the date of the injury
and ten years from the date of the first sale or one year following
the anticipated life of the product."0
Defenses and Presumptions"'
Arizona has created three affirmative defenses in the products
liability field, effective September 15, 1978. The first affirmative
defense is that the product as manufactured conformed to the
"state of the art" if the defect is alleged to be the result of im-
proper design or fabrication."8 The second affirmative defense is
that the proximate cause of the injury was a modification by a
third party." The third affirmative defense is that the injury was
caused by the unforeseeable misuse of the product.8 ' A Georgia
law, effective July 1, 1978, has statutorily created an affirmative
defense based on substantial alteration of the product after its
sale, if such alteration was the proximate cause of the injury."
Effective June 1, 1978, defenses for products liability actions
based on strict liability in tort in Indiana include assumption of
the risk, non-foreseeable misuse, non-foreseeable modifications and,
for design defect cases only, that the product was manufactured
in compliance with the state of the art at the time of manufac-
ture." The defendant manufacturer or seller has the burden of
proof of these defenses."7 Kentucky has adopted statutes, effective
June 17, 1978, which provide that a manufacturer is liable only
for damage which would have occurred had the product been
used in its original unmodified condition. Failure to provide rou-
tine maintenance is considered to be a modification but these
revisions do not apply to modifications made in accordance with
manufacturers' instructions. If the unauthorized modification or
failure to exercise ordinary care was a substantial cause of the
10TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3703 (Supp. 1978).
81 Oregon has adopted the defense of unforeseeable alteration and a rebuttable
presumption that products are safe as manufactured and sold. OR. REv. STAT.
$ 30.910, 30.915 (1977).
82Aiuz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (1978).
-Id. § 12-683(2).
-1d. § 12-683(3).
8GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106(b)(1) (1978).
"IND. CODE ANN. 33-1-1.5-4 (Burns 1978).
87 Id.
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occurrence, there is no liability even if the product is otherwise
defective.8 The rebuttable presumption is created that no defect
exists if the product conforms to generally recognized standards
or the state of the art but the presumption may be rebutted by a
preponderence of evidence to the contrary." A Minnesota law,
effective August 1, 1978, has adopted the ordinary useful life of
the product as the time limit within which a claim may be
brought. The manufacturer has an absolute defense if the claim
is brought based on an injury sustained following expiration of
the ordinary useful life. The ordinary useful life is the period dur-
ing which the product should be useful with reasonable safety to
the user. Additionally, Minnesota adopted the doctrine of com-
parative negligence and applied it to strict tort liability." A Ne-
braska law, effective July 21, 1978, likewise adopted the doctrine
of comparative negligence and applies it to strict tort liability with
the modification that where the defendant's negligence is gross in
comparison to the plaintiff's, the plaintiff's negligence shall be
considered merely in mitigation of damages. Additionally, Ne-
braska has adopted a defense based on the state of the art which
is defined as the best technology reasonably available at the time.
Effective July 1, 1978, Tennessee joined the states providing for
a defense in products liability actions based on product alterations
which make the product unreasonably dangerous if it was not so
at the time it leaves the seller's control. Tennessee does not re-
quire the manufacturer to warn of a danger or hazard apparent
to the ordinary user and adopts a rebuttable presumption that the
product was not defective if the manufacturer complied with gov-
ernmental standards. The state of the art at the time the product
was placed on the market is a consideration in determining whether
the product was defective at that time."
Definition of Products Liability Action
Effective September 15, 1978, an Arizona statute has defined a
products liability action as any action for damages brought against
" 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, § 4.
"Id. § 3(2).
"1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 738 (West).
:'Neb. L.B. 665 (1978).
2 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3704, 23-3705 (Supp. 1978).
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a manufacturer or seller of a product for bodily injury, death or
property damage allegedly caused by or resulting from the manu-
facture, construction, design, formula, installation, preparation,
assembly, testing, packaging, labeling, sale, use or consumption
of any product. This includes the failure to warn or to protect
against the danger or hazard which caused the injury and the fail-
ure to provide proper instructions for the use or consumption of
the product." An Indiana law, effective June 1, 1978, adopted a
broader definition which includes all actions for injury caused by
any of the factors involved in the manufacture or distribution of
a product. ' A similarly broad definition was adopted by Kentucky
on June 17, 1978.' The Nebraska statute, effective July 21, 1978,
adopted a definition of products liability actions substantially simi-
lar to that adopted by Arizona." A Tennessee statute, effective
July 1, 1978, has adopted a definition which defines the terms
"defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous." A products
liability action is defined in terms of the factors involved in the
production and distribution of a product and the various legal
theories, such as negligence, warning, failure to warn of an obvious
defect, upon which a cause of action to recover for injuries might
be based."7
Applicability and Limitations on a Doctrine of Strict Liability in
Tort
The thrust of the Arizona statute is to place the liability on the
manufacturer rather than the seller. This is accomplished by pro-
viding that a manufacturer who refuses to accept a tender of
defense from a seller shall indemnify the seller and reimburse him
for costs and attorney's fees for any judgment against the seller,
unless the seller had knowledge of the defect or the seller altered
or installed the product, which was a substantial cause of the in-
jury, not authorized by the manufacturer, and not performed in
compliance with the directions or specifications of the manufac-
turer." If the seller, however, provides plans or specifications, the
91ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(3) (1978).
"IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4 (Burns 1978).
11 1978 Ky. Acts. ch. 91, § 2(1).
O"Neb. L.B. 665 (1978).
97 TENN. CODE ANN. SS 23-3702(e)-(f) (Supp. 1978).
91 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-684(A) (1978).
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seller must then indemnify the manufacturer for any judgment
against it unless the manufacturer had or should have had knowl-
edge of the defect at the time of the sale of the product."' A
Georgia law, effective July 1, 1978, eliminated the requirement of
privity in actions for tort and holds manufacturers of personal
property sold as new property liable in tort for injury caused by
the sale of unmerchantable property, when the unmerchantable
defect was the proximate cause of the injury.'" Effective June 1,
1978, Indiana codified Section 402(A) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts." ' Kentucky, effective June 17, 1978, exempts a
seller from liability if the manufacturer is identified and subject
to jurisdiction in Kentucky provided the product was sold in its
original manufactured condition or package. The only instance in
which the seller can be liable is if he knew or should have known
that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous and defective
condition at the time of the sale." ' After July 21, 1978, Nebraska
sellers are strictly liable in tort only where they are also the manu-
facturer.'" Tennessee has adopted a provision, effective July 1,
1978, similar to that of Kentucky, in that the seller is not liable
if he sells a product in a sealed container or where he has no
reasonable opportunity to inspect the product. Additionally, he is
not strictly liable in tort unless he is either also the manufacturer
or the manufacturer is not subject to jurisdiction in Tennessee.'"
Admissibility of Evidence
Arizona has adopted an evidentiary rule in products liability
actions, effective September 15, 1978, which precludes the admis-
sion of evidence of changes or advances in the state of the art or
any change in the design or method of manufacturing similar
products subsequent to the time the product was designed, for any
purpose.'" A Kentucky law, effective June 17, 1978, has made
evidence of subsequent design changes or improvements admissible
so Id. § 12-684(C).
'0DGA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(a), 106(b)(1) (1978).
101 IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4 (Burns 1978).
' 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, § 6.
'"Neb. L.B. 665 (1978).
104TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3706 (Supp. 1978).
'" ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (1978).
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only after a determination of relevancy and materiality by the
court without a jury.' Nebraska has adopted the rule that evi-
dence of remedial measures is admissible only for purposes such
as proof of ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary mea-
sures, effective July 21, 1978.0
Ad Damnum Clause
Both Arizona and Minnesota have eliminated the ad damnum
clause in products liability litigation. In Arizona, effective Sep-
tember 15, 1978, no dollar amount may be included in the com-
plaint. A mere statement that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied
must be included.' In Minnesota, a dollar amount may be in-
cluded in the complaint only if the amount claimed is less than
$50,000. If it is greater than $50,000 the complaint shall so
state. '
Miscellaneous Changes
Minnesota has adopted three other provisions, effective August
1, 1978, in the area of products liability. The first of these is that
the award of punitive damages requires clear and convincing proof
that the defendant acted with wilful indifference to the rights and
safety of others. Recovery of punitive damages against the master
or principal is limited and any award must be measured by those
factors which would ordinarily bear on the purpose of punitive
damages. Additionally, Minnesota has provided for contribution
in proportion to percentage of fault, but, if all or part of a
party's equitable share is uncollectible from that party, the amount
so uncollectible shall be reallocated. Finally, costs, disbursements
and reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party if the other party and/or his attorney is found to have acted
in bad faith."'
Insurance Regulations
Five states have enacted statutes requiring products liability
insurers to file reports with the state government. Effective Jan-
10 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 91, S 5.
07 Neb. L.B. 665 (1978).
'1'ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 12-685 (1978).
100 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 738 (West).
110 Id.
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uary 1, 1979, Arizona requires that such an insurer write a report
including product liability claims against its insureds, located in
the state, which were closed, either by payment or some other
action, during the preceding year.11 Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska and Florida have adopted similar statutes."'
(3) Model Products Liability Law
On Friday, January 12, 1979, the Department of Commerce
published in the Federal Register the "Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law.""' This draft represents the culmination of the
efforts begun by the Products Liability Task Force which led to
the report discussed previously, issued in November of 1977. The
Model Act defines its coverage as creating a claim for either per-
sonal injury, death or property damage caused by a defective
product to any person harmed and imposes liability on the product
seller which includes the manufacturer.' The claim created by the
Model Act supersedes any action based on strict liability in tort,
breach of warranty, or any other substantive legal theory in tort
or contract. ' The Act further creates three basic standards of
responsibility. The first is that the product was defective because
not made in accordance with the product seller's own design and
manufacturing standards."' The second is that the product was
defective in design because the manufacturer should have used
an alternative design which was, among other considerations, tech-
nologically feasible and which would have prevented the harm
suffered by the claimant."' The third basic standard of respon-
sibility involves a product which was defective because it did not
contain adequate warnings. The standards for adequate warnings
are similar to those for defect in design."8 If some aspect of the
product is unavoidably unsafe, the product seller is not subject to
"IAiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 20-223.01 (1978).
12 GA. CODE ANN. § 560-319.1; Ga. S.B. 514 (eff. Mar. 5, 1979); Kan. H.B.
2410; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.061 (West 1977); Neb. L.B. 665 (1978); 1978
Fla. Sess. Law Serv. § 78-418.
1144 Fed. Reg. 2,995 (1979).
11 Id. at 2,997-98.
15 Id. at 2,998, S 102(2).
"' Id. § 104(A).
1 1 Id. S 104(B).
"1 Id. § 104(C).
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liability for harm caused by that aspect of the product. 1 '
The term "state of the art" is defined as relevant knowledge in
existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufac-
ture.'" Evidence of changes in the state of the art subsequent to
manufacture are inadmissible generally and certain criteria may
be the basis for a motion for summary judgment.' Similar stand-
ards are created for a defense based on compliance with legisla-
tive or administrative standards.'
One novel aspect of the Model Act is that it requires any attor-
ney who enters into an attorney-client relationship with a potential
claimant to notify the product seller within six months of the
date of the beginning of that relationship. " The product seller is
then required to advise the attorney of all other sellers and manu-
facturers in the chain of manufacture and distribution.' If the
failure of either the attorney or the product seller to comply with
the requirements of this section leads to monetary loss, the non-
complying party is liable for damages, costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees."
The Model Act also defines the term "useful safe life" to be the
reasonably expected safe use of the product. This includes normal
deterioration as well as any modification or alteration of the
product by a third party.'" It provides that the product seller shall
not be liable for injury caused by the product after its useful safe
life." A similar concept is the "statutes of repose." These deal both
with traditional workmen's compensation cases as well as non-
work related injuries. In the case of a work-place injury, a claimant
otherwise entitled to workmen's compensation, may bring a claim
under the Model Act for injury occurring within ten years after
the delivery of the completed product to the first purchaser."' If
the ten year period has expired but the worker can otherwise prove
"Id. S 105(c).
1 Id. S 106(a).
121 Id. S 106.





12 7 Id. 5 109(A)(2).
12 Id. 5 109(B)(1)(a).
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that the product was unsafe, he may increase his claim in work-
men's compensation to cover wages which would otherwise not
be compensated."9 This also includes wrongful death cases."" An
employer who is subject to liability under these provisions may
seek contribution from the product seller which shall be limited
to the seller's comparative fault.1 For non-work place injuries, or
injuries occurring after ten years from the date the product is
first sold, there is a presumption that the product has exceeded
its useful life."' Additionally, all claims under the Act must be
brought within three years of the time of discovery or when dis-
covery should have occurred of the facts giving rise to the claim."
The Act creates an additional defense of third-party alteration and
modification' and adopts the standard of comparative conduct
and provides that damages are to be apportioned accordingly.13
The defense of knowingly using a defective product is an absolute
defense." The Model Act further provides for contribution and
implied indemnity among multiple defendants and the standard is
the comparative standard used as to all parties. 3 In conjunction
with the section on workmen's compensation statutes, this may
assist the product manufacturer who is now the target defendant
in a workmen's, compensation case.
It is uncertain, however, whether this will have any impact on
the manufacturers of military products who are now target defend-
ants if a serviceman is injured or killed. This is particularly true
in light of the decision by the Supreme Court in Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States,'M which prohibited a third-
party action by the manufacturer against the United States
where the suit was initiated by a serviceman. This is an extension
of the doctrine of immunity for the United States from suits by
servicemen created by the same Court twenty-seven years earlier
1291d. § 109(B)(I)(b).
134 d. § 109(B)(1)(c).
131 Id. § 109(B)(1)(d).
11Id. at 3,000, 5 109(B) (2).
1 Id. § 109(C).





13-431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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in Feres v. United States."3 This position was recently reaffirmed
when a petition for certiorari was denied in Textron Inc. v. United
States and the Commonwealth of Virginia,' where an attempt
was made to obtain contribution when the deaths of two National
Guardsmen had occurred in an accident involving a ten-year-old
Army helicopter. Certainly, if a Model Act is to be adopted, it
should be redrafted to cover this situation.
Finally, the Model Act provides for arbitration of any products
liability claim where the amount in dispute is less than $30,000.1'
The Act provides for a limitation on "pain and suffering" to
$25,000 in cases where there is no permanent serious disfigure-
ment, impairment of bodily function or mental illness as a result of
the injury." Additionally, any recovery is to be diminished by com-
pensation received from a public source." Punitive damages may
be awarded if reckless disregard is shown; among other items to be
considered, however, is the possibility of other punitive damages
awards to persons similarly situated.'"
Of all of the proposed legislation purporting to establish a body
of law in the products laiblity field, it is submitted that this pro-
posed "Model Act" has the greatest probability of ultimate en-
actment since it is being sponsored by the Department of Com-
merce, and consequently is not vulnerable to change of sponsor-
ship as are some of the other bills. Furthermore, in view of the
impact of product liability litigation on the aircraft industry, one
of the few remaining areas which contributes positively to the
United States' balance of payments through the export of com-
mercial and military aircraft, it is probable that legislation of this
kind will receive favorable attention from Congress. There are
some areas not adequately covered by this proposal, however,
which should be the subject of comment by members of the in-
dustry and the bar. Furthermore, considering the time it took to
finally obtain universal acceptance of other model acts such as
139 340 U.S, 135 (1950).
140 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (Dec. 12, 1978).
14144 Fed. Reg. 3,001, S 116 (1979).




the Uniform Commercial Code, it may be some time before such
a comprehensive product liability act is adopted by all the states.
II. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 " not only amends, but
virtually replaces the economic regulation provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958'" in what is surely the most comprehen-
sive overhaul of a government regulatory scheme in history. The
preamble states that the purpose of the Act is to foster an air
transportation system which relies on minimally restricted com-
petition to determine the quality, variety and cost of air services.
In fact, the Act is intended to remove to the greatest extent possible
the government control of air carriers. To this end, it moves
affirmatively to establish procedures intended to create a system of
permissive entry into and exit from air routes, flexibility in the
establishment of fares and services, and the gradual phasing out
of the controlling agency and most of that agency's currently con-
stituted authority. These affirmative steps are cautiously restrained
through specific directives to prevent industry concentration and
preserve, where possible, essential air service to small communities.
To facilitate this basic change in treatment of the air transporta-
tion industry, the Act reorients policy guidelines, creates various
presumptions intended to favor its new policies, and shifts burdens
of proof and persuasion which formerly served as bulwarks of
industry protection.
Section 31" of the Act sets out ten policy considerations which
the Civil Aeronautics Board'" is to apply with regard to decisions
affecting interstate and overseas air transportation. "9 The Act
45Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as "the
Act"]. There are understandable exceptions and exemptions created throughout
the Act for air transportation in Alaska and Hawaii. Because of the nature of this
article there will generally be no attempt to address these specific provisions.
1-49 U.S.C. §5 1301 et seq. (1976).
14792 Stat. 1705-07 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).
' The Civil Aeronautics Board is referred to alternatively as the "CAB" or
the "Board".
149 The Act was not intended to substantially affect foreign air transportation
and Congress specifically did not consider this aspect of the air transportation
industry when it amended the policy section of the old legislation. See S. RaP.
No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978).
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states that safety is to have the highest priority in air commerce5
and recites numerous other goals, including low priced services
and prompt administrative decisions. It is clear, however, that the
overriding theme of both the policy declarations and the Act as
a whole is the fostering of competition among the air carriers. The
Act rejects policies under the old regulatory scheme which were
intended to protect the industry and generally endorses the recent
policies of the CAB directed at encouraging free competition
qualified only by the political constraints of small town interests
and the always present fear of a too successful competitor. Its clear
preoccupation with competition can best be seen by examining
how Congress sought to implement this new policy.
A. Entry and Exit
The sunset provisions of the Actf1" will result in a totally un-
regulated route structure by 1981. ' Until then, however, the most
significant change from past policy is the creation of a new standard
to be applied to applicants seeking route authority. In Section 8, '
and throughout the Act,"' the "public convenience and necessity"
test is softened. The formerly rigorously applied standard, which
necessitated a finding that the proposed service was "required,"
is now a more liberal policy under which the CAB may grant such
authority where the service is merely "consistent with" the public
convenience and necessity.'" To facilitate this finding, the Act
creates a presumption of consistency and places upon those who
would oppose the new service the burden of proof in rebutting
that presumption.' Lest the old protectionist attitudes of the CAB
150 In fact, Congressional interest in safety matters appears to have been
confined primarily to extending insurance requirements and the application of
existing regulations to commuter and non-certified carriers, and calling for vari-
ous studies as to the effects of the Act. The Act, §§ 5, 20, 32-33, 92 Stat. 1709-10
1721-23, 1732-40 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(q)(1), 1386(b)(4),
1389(c)(3) and 1307(b), respectively), see also H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 87, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3799-800.
"I The Act adds new Title XVI (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1551).
5' See notes 186, 200 and 209 infra, and accompanying text.
15392 Stat. 1712 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1371(d)(1)-(3)).
'54 See notes 136-137, supra, and accompanying text.
155 The old standard continues to apply to foreign air transportation. The Act
S 8, 92 Stat. 1712 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1371(d)(1)-(3)(B)).
15' The Act S 14, 92 Stat. 1719 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. 5
1371(d) (9)).
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re-emerge, the Act further establishes that the opponents must
meet this burden with a preponderance of the evidence."' The net
effect of these changes is that any applicant who can meet its
burden by demonstrating that it is "fit, willing and able" to provide
the service proposed may be certificated by the Board."
In order to allow the carriers to adopt their market structures
gradually to the eventual total deregulation of the industry, the
Act establishes three programs to facilitate the award of certifi-
cates. Section 12.' of the Act establishes the automatic entry pro-
gram which allows Board certificated passenger carriers and major
interstate carriers"' to apply for non-stop route authority between
any one pair of points during each of the next three years."'
Established carriers are permitted to similarly protect one route
per year during this period and the CAB has authority to step in
and take appropriate measures to prevent major market disloca-
tions from causing substantial public harm to the transportation
system as a whole or a substantial reduction in air service to smaller
communities in any region of the country. The most significant
aspect of this program is that there is no public convenience and
necessity test for applications filed under it. Moreover, the Board's
recently adopted multiple permissive entry policy, under which
more than one carrier may receive authority for the same route,
has been specifically endorsed by Congress" and insures that eco-




5'92 Stat. 1716-18 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(7)).
'0 Major interstate carriers are state certificated carriers which have operated
more than 100,000,000 available seat miles during the preceding year.
"'The years are 1979, 1980 and 1981. 92 Stat. 1716 (1978) (to be codified
in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (7) (A) ). The Act also provides for a second round of
applications for those carriers which were not certificated because the Board
determined they did not meet the fitness requirements for the particular route
or where more than one carrier applied for the same route. If the carrier is
successful in its application in the second round, it loses any authority granted
in the first series of applications. 92 Stat. 1717 (1978) (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. S 1371(d)(7)(B)).
"' H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3775.
"' For industry reaction to this program, see Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
September 4, 1978, at 53-54.
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The second innovative program relates to unused or dormant
authority not exercised sufficiently to satisfy the minimum standard
created by Section 10'" of the new Act.' Although the actual
procedures vary depending on the number of carriers, if any, serv-
ing the route on which the authority is dormant,166 their overall
effect is to encourage the exercise of the authority granted to either
the old or new carrier. The public convenience and necessity
standard applies to routes served by more than one carrier, but
the Act creates a rebuttable presumption that an application to
replace a dormant carrier is consistent with the public convenience
and necessity and requires the CAB to issue a certificate to the
first applicant to apply after the route becomes dormant." ' As
further encouragement, the CAB has, discretion to suspend the
holder of a dormant authority on a route not otherwise served
during the start-up period for the new applicant.' 6 Although the
Act permits the holder of a dormant authority to protect itself by
giving notice of its intention to reactivate service, it further en-
sures that the dormancy will not be prolonged or repeated by re-
quiring that the service be recommenced within a minimum
amount of time6 " and that such notice of intention to reactivate
can only be filed once for any particular market. 0 The Board re-
tains leverage over the replacement carrier to provide the service
it has requested authority for because it does not have to suspend
" 92 Stat. 1713-16 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(5)).
16 Excepting specific seasonal authority and breaks in service due to labor
disputes, the minimum service required is five round trips per week for at least
thirteen weeks during any twenty-six week period. 92 Stat. 1713 (1978) (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (5) (A)). Determination of which routes are
actually dormant has proved to be no easy task for either the airlines or the CAB.
See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., December 18, 1978, at 23.
16 The Board must authorize the new service within either fifteen or sixty days
from the date of the application depending upon whether the route is served
by fewer or more than two carriers. Compare The Act § 10, 92 Stat. 1714
(1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(5)(C)) with The Act S 10, 92
Stat. 1715 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(5)(F)).
"'
7 See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., note 165 supra.
'"Unless it finds that the suspension is unnecessary to encourage the new
applicant, the Board must suspend the incumbent for up to twenty-six weeks. The
Act § 10, 92 Stat. 1716 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(5)(J)).
"'
9 The minimum time is thirty days. The Act § 10, 92 Stat. 1715 (1978) (to be




the dormant incumbent unless it finds that such suspension is neces-
sary to encourage the service by the newly authorized carrier.
Section 1371 of the Act authorizes the Board to issue certificates
in order to test or assess experimental services which would pro-
vide innovative or low-priced air transportation. Other liberalities
afforded by the Act include new fill-up rights which allow a carrier
operating an overseas flight with more than one pick-up point in
the United States a limited right to carry domestic passengers be-
between those interstate points."' Similarly, the Act voids closed-
door restrictions in existing certificates and prohibits their applica-
tion in future grants of authority. ' " The Act calls for the CAB
to establish simplified procedures for making its determinations."
In this same regard, it establishes new deadlines for CAB determi-
nations which ensure that except for delays caused by the appli-
cant, no case may take longer than one year to decide. Under the
sunset provisions, the CAB will no longer concern itself after
1981 with applying the public convenience and necessity test but
will, until its scheduled disestablishment in 1985, continue to de-
termine the fitness of individual applicants."
B. Fares
In keeping with its general goal of increased competition, the
Act provides a statutory endorsement of recent policies of the CAB
intended to increase flexibility in fare structures and service by
the air carriers. Section 377 defines a "standard industry fare
level .'". around which it establishes a zone within which the CAB
'The Act § 13, 92 Stat. 1718-19 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §
1371(d)(8)).
'72The Act § 11, 92 Stat. 1716 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S
1371(d) (6)).
17 The Act § 16, 92 Stat. 1719-20 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. 5
1371(e)(7)). In addition to a blanket exemption for points in Hawaii, closed-
door restrictions resulting from a sale, exchange or transfer of authority between
air carriers are exempt from this section. Id.
174 The Act § 21, 92 Stat. 1723-24 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
1371(p)).
's See note 151 supra.
171 The Act § 37, 92 Stat. 1741-43 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
1482(d)).
177 "Standard Industry Fare Level" means the fare in effect on July 1, 1977,
as adjusted by the Board, or on new services, the initial fare. The Act § 37, 92
Stat. 1741-42 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (6) (A)).
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may not find a fare unjust or unreasonable unless it pertains to a
market clearly dominated by a single carrier. " The zone protects
fare adjustments up to five percent above and fifty percent below
the standard industry fare level." The Board is authorized to ex-
pand the zone downward through the rulemaking process and is
required to adjust the industry fare level at least twice a year.'"
There is no presumption that rate changes which fall outside the
established zone are unjust or unreasonable but such findings
would, of course, enable the Board to suspend or replace them with
lawful fares. The party opposing a fare as too low bears the burden
of proof on this issue. Within the zone, only those fares found to
be predatory may be suspended.
The fare zone created by the Act is similar in its effect to the
criteria recently applied by the CAB under the Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation (DPFI) standards.1"' Under the DPFI, the
Board could still find a fare unjust or unreasonable even though
it fell within the DPFI's nominally suspension-free zone. Where
the suspension-free zone and the new zone overlap, that vestige
of power will now be restricted. The suspension-free zone had been
based on "normal" fares prescribed by the CAB while the zone
established by the Act has a more realistic base in the form of
the standard industry fare level which relies on actual costs. "
The CAB's new authority with regard to fares would not appear
to be any less flexible than under the DPFI, since as previously
mentioned, the Act also permits the Board to expand the zone
(at least downward) through the rulemaking process.
The criteria laid down by the Act with regard to the CAB's
rate regulation indicates a clear congressional policy favoring
low fares and the encouragement of pricing and service options.
The Board is specifically required to expand the availability of
170 A dominating carrier is one which carries seventy percent or more of the
certificated carrier passenger traffic in that market, The Act S 37, 92 Stat. 1741
(1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (4) (A)).
17" Id. The upper limit of the zone became effective July 1, 1979.
' The adjustments are to reflect the percentage change in the industry's
average actual operating cost per available seat-mile for both interstate and over-
seas transportation. The Board is specifically prohibited from artificially adjust-
ing these costs, The Act § 37, 92 Stat. 1742 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
1482(d)(6)(B)).
10 43 Fed. Reg. 39,522 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the DPFI].
182 See note 180, supra, and accompanying text.
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off-peak fares which were obviously a particular favorite of the
Congress. ' Although the carrier is to be allowed to determine
prices in response to its own costs and the market conditions in
the areas which it serves, complaints by affected civic authorities
are provided for and accorded expedited handling.'" In the area
of commuter traffic, the Act requires certified carriers to extend
joint fares to commuter carriers ' and requires the CAB to ex-
tend any uniform formula which it might develop for such joint
fares to the commuter carriers as well. Needless to say, if the
congressional intent is realized, all of these provisions will termi-
nate on January 1, 1985, when the Board is tentatively scheduled
to go out of existence under the sunset provisions of the Act."
C. Anti-trust
The liberalizing aspects of the Act are least noticeable in the
anti-trust area and, in fact, it provides more stringent standards
in some cases. 8 ' If any relaxation of regulation in this area is to
be found in the Act, it is section 26," which narrows the class of
transactions which must be approved by the CAB. Where formerly
any consolidation, merger or acquisition involving a person en-
gaged in "any phase of aeronautics" was prohibited unless approved
by the Board after notice and hearing,"' the new Act replaces this
broadly interpreted phrase with a narrower class of "persons sub-
stantially engaged in the business of aeronautics."'" Similarly,
acquisitions of air carriers by persons with no other aviation inter-
ests have been removed from the CAB's jurisdiction. In all of these
cases, however, the transactions will of course be subject to the
anti-trust laws administered by other agencies.
1'3See S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1978).
18 The Board must grant, deny or dismiss such complaints within ninety days,
The Act S 37, 92 Stat. 1742 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (8)).
18' The old Act required only that the joint fares be extended to other certifi-
cated carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a)(1) (1976).
18See note 151, supra, and accompanying text.
187 There was also an abortive attempt to bring international air transporta-
tion into the anti-trust framework, but the pro-competitive proposal was lost in
the flurry of activity which surrounded the Congress' preoccupation with the Act.
S. 3363, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
1892 Stat. 1726-28 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1378).
18849 U.S.C. 1378 (1976).
'The Act § 27, 92 Stat. 1726 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1379).
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Although the Act continues the prohibition against approving
any transaction that would result in a monopoly, it provides some
additional guidance as to the new and tougher "public interest"
standard to be applied by the CAB under the new legislation."'
This new public interest test would not be satisfied where the
effect of approving the transaction would result in substantially
lessened competition in any region unless the CAB finds both (1)
that the negative effects are outweighed by the probable satis-
faction of significant transportation needs, and (2) no reasonably
available and less harmful alternative is available. 9" Opponents
of the transaction have the burden of proving its negative impact
while proponents must negate the availability of any less anti-
competitive alternatives. The prohibition against interlocking rela-
tionships between and among carriers has been liberalized by
narrowing the class of persons affected to the new standard of
those "substantially engaged in the business of aeronautics. ' .3
While under the former regulatory scheme agreements between
air carriers affecting domestic air transportation had to be filed
with the CAB, such filings are now only voluntary.'" The new Act
requires the Board to apply a more stringent public interest test,
however, in that an agreement which has a negative impact upon
competition may no longer be approved simply by demonstrating
that it satisfies a serious transportation need or secures important
public benefits."' It must now also be shown that the same ends
are not attainable by reasonably available and less anti-competitive
means. The burdens which must be met are slightly different from
those which apply to the merger transactions, however, in that
the proponents of the agreement must still satisfy the old test while
the opponents must prove the availability of the less restrictive
alternatives."'
"' Guidance under the old Act was virtually non-existent. See 49 U.S.C.
1378 (1976).
12 This language is uniform throughout the anti-trust section of the Act. 92
Stat. 1726-31 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378-1379, 1382).
'The Act § 27, 92 Stat. 1726 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1379).
'By filing, however, the carrier may obtain the somewhat narrower anti-
trust immunity which CAB approval now carries. See note 197 infra.
'9 The standard is the "local cartage" test. Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15
CAB 850 (1952). See also CAB Order No. 78-8-150 (August 25, 1978).
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The anti-trust immunity conferred by CAB approval is now
more restrictive in that it applies only to the anti-trust laws and
then only to the extent necessary to permit the transactions
specifically approved or contemplated by the CAB."' Of equal im-
portance, however, is the fact that such immunity no longer auto-
matically accompanies CAB approval but lies within the CAB's
discretion. The exercise of such discretion is restricted by the
public interest test."' In keeping with its tougher anti-trust policy,
the Act renders ineffective all current mutual aid agreements and
narrowly proscribes any future pacts.'" If all proceeds as scheduled,
the remaining anti-trust authority and responsibility of the Board
will be transferred to the Department of Justice on January 1,
1985.' Considering the pro-competitive emphasis of the Act itself,
this change in responsibility can hardly be viewed as an improve-
ment by the airlines in view of the tougher anti-trust position
usually adopted by the Department of Justice and may partially
explain the current merger rush now sweeping the industry."'
Indeed, increased anti-trust activity in the aviation industry can be
projected particularly if the increased competition with reduced
fares contemplated by the Act does not materialize.
D. Small Community Service
The Act does away with the thirty-year-old fiction of subsidizing
air carriers through compensation for the carriage of mail and re-
places it with a realistic system of subsidies intended to sustain
service to small communities in the face of real world economies
now unleashed by the drive for competition. To avoid market dis-
the agreement. The Act S 28, 92 Stat. 1730 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
5 1382(c) (2) (C)).
"
TThe Act § 30, 92 Stat. 1731 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1384).
Formerly, Board approval carried with it immunity from both the antitrust and
other laws which would otherwise restrict the transaction or relationship. 49
U.S.C. § 1384 (1976).
"IThe Act S 30, 92 Stat. 1731 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1384).
"'The Act § 29, 92 Stat. 1730-31 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §
1382). For at least one airline's opinion of the current agreements, see Av. WEEK
& SPACE TECH., July 24, 1978, at 34.
"'See note 151 supra. Authority over domestic mergers and interlocking re-
lationships will be transferred to the Department of Justice on January 1, 1983.
The Act, tit. XVI (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a) (3)).
" 'see Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., September 4, 1978, at 36-37.
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locations, Section 33.. provides for a phasing out of the current
subsidy program in favor of the new structure which for ten years
will guarantee essential air service. The new program is self-
limiting in that the CAB may not provide a subsidy in excess of
that which is needed to maintain the essential services.
The current subsidy program, although nominally compensating
for mail service, has been aimed at sustaining small local carriers
rather than at providing necessary services to small communi-
ties. In reorienting its policy away from the subsidy of carriers
and to small community assistance, the Act correspondingly does
away, for a four-year period, with the current profit sharing
formula employed by the CAB. Under this formula, profits from
non-subsidized portions of the carriers' operations were used to
offset the subsidies paid to it. Since the carriers' profit or economic
viability is no longer the object of the subsidy, this formula is now
no longer appropriate. During the phase-out period, the Act re-
quires that subsidies be kept at such a level as to maintain services
at their 1977 levels. Should a local carrier stop serving a particular
point, it cannot have the old subsidy or that applicable during the
phase-out period resumed for that point. It can, however, apply
for a subsidy under the new program.
The new subsidy program requires the CAB to guarantee for
ten years "essential air service" to the smaller American commu-
nities presently appearing on the certificate of an air carrier,
whether or not service is currently being provided, and those which
have been removed from certificates during the last ten years!"
Depending upon the number of carriers serving a particular
"eligible point," the CAB must determine what constitutes "essen-
tial air transportation"' for that point and review these determi-
292 Stat. 1732-40 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1389).
=Although slightly different determinations must be made with regard to
communities currently certificated as opposed to those which have been removed
from certificates since July 1, 1968, the subsidy programs are virtually identical
for both groups with the exception that the CAB may not require a carrier to
continue service to a city within the latter category. Compare The Act S 33,
adding S 419(a), 92 Stat. 1732-33 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S
1389(a)) with The Act § 33, adding S 419(b), 92 Stat. 1736 (1978) (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1371).
2" "Essential air transportation" is defined as reasonable access to the na-
tional air transportation system and not less than the 1977 service or two daily
round trips, five days a week, whichever is less. The Act S 33, 92 Stat. 1739
(1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1371(f)).
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nations periodically.' If the Board finds that a community will
not receive essential air transportation without compensation, it
is required to invite applications for the performance of subsidized
service.' Where volunteers are not forthcoming, the CAB must
require a carrier, including non-certificated carriers, to continue
service while the CAB uses "every effort" to find a replacement.'
Such forced service can be required for an indefinite series of
thirty-day periods. The carrier during this period would, of course,
be entitled to subsidy either at the rate then currently received
or an amount equal to its losses. The CAB is required to report
to Congress on the feasibility and appropriateness of devising
formulas by which the local civic recipients of the benefits of these
subsidy programs could contribute or share the cost of such sub-
sidies' and, of course, civic input into the entire subsidy process
is considerable.
In keeping with its primary emphasis, the Act provides that
starting in 1983 a carrier subsidized under the old or outgoing
program may be replaced by an applicant who can show that it
can improve service and reduce the subsidy at a particular point
Similarly, a subsidized carrier under the new program may be
replaced after two years where the applicant can show that it
can improve service or operate in such a way as to reduce the
subsidy. In the interest of safety, commuter services under the
new program are brought under tighter control by requiring the
CAB to apply its "fit, willing and able" test to all such subsidized
carriers. Such commuters are similarly required to comply with
all new FAA standards and particularly satisfy the insurance re-
quirements of the Act. The CAB is further directed to establish by
rulemaking procedures realistic subsidy computation guidelines
which must include expense elements based upon representative
25 The Board has at least six months in which to make its initial determina-
tions. The Act § 33, adding S 419(a) (2) (B), 92 Stat. 1733 (1978) (to be codified
in 49 U.S.C. S 1371), and the Act § 33, adding § 419(b) (4) (A), 92 Stat. 1737
(1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. 51376).
1 The desirability of a linear system and the applicant's experience are fac-
tors which the CAB must consider in granting the subsidy to a particular appli-
cant. The Act § 33, adding § 419(a)(4), 92 Stat. 1733-34 (1978), and S
419(b)(5), 92 Stat. 1737 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §51371 & 1376
and §5 1389(a)(4) & (b)(5), respectively).
"7 See note 199 supra.
29The Act § 5, 92 Stat. 1709 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1306).
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
costs of carriers operating aircraft of a type appropriate to the
essential air transportation as defined for any particular point.
The Department of Transportation will assume responsibility for
administering the subsidy program on January 1, 1985, when the
Board is tentatively scheduled to go out of existence.'
E. Miscellaneous
(1) Charters
In addressing the problems of the expanding field of low-cost
air transportation, the Act endorses recent CAB policies in the
area of charter fares regarded by many as overly liberal and at
the same time specifically proscribes certain activities which a
zealous panel might see as the next logical step in liberalization.
Section 20210 not only endorses the Public Charter rule by provid-
ing that the CAB may not restrict the normal commercial decisions
of charter operators, except to the extent required by the public
interest, but also prohibits the Board from backsliding into more
restrictive regulations than were in effect at the time Congress was
considering the deregulation legislation.11' The Act also specifically
prohibits the commingling of chartered and scheduled passengers
as well as the marketing of inclusive tours by charter air carriers.
The legislative history, however, indicates that this last prohibition
is not carved in granite but may be subject to CAB exemptions
intended to test the advantages of such packages.""
(2) Federal Prerogatives
Lest there be any doubt, the Act now specifically provides for
federal preemption of the field of the regulation of carriers certi-
fied for interstate service. ' Moreover, Section 4 provides that in
any case where the federal and state jurisdictions overlap a par-
ticular carrier, the federal authority is deemed to adopt the state
20 See note 151 supra.
110 The Act S 20, 92 Stat. 1721 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S
1371(n)).
2 That date was October 1, 1978. The Act § 20, 92 Stat. 1721 (1978) (to
be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1371(n)(2)).
212 H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3785-86. For industry opinion on a related subject, see
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., August 28, 1978, at 29.
21' The Act S 4, 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1305).
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
authority until otherwise passed upon by the CAB. This leaves to
state regulation only those air carriers which provide services com-
pletely within the state's territory. The Act similarly preempts a
former presidential prerogative by narrowing the review of CAB
international route decisions by the Chief Executive.1" The Presi-
dent may no longer bequeath international routes but is limited
to disapproving CAB decisions and then solely upon the basis of
foreign relations or national defense considerations. Moreover,
Section 34 specifically prohibits the President from exercising even
his right of disapproval on the basis of economic or carrier selec-
tion considerations.
Section 31 " ' of the Act continues to provide the Board with
authority to exempt carriers from its economic regulations but
expands upon previous authority. It eliminates all restrictions on
the category of persons which might receive an exemption and also
removes the narrow and negative standard of the previous legisla-
tion and replaces it with the new Act's liberalized standard of
consistency with the public interest. Section 201 ' extends to all
carriers the CAB's authority to require insurance protection and
Section 3917 restricts disclosure of information by the govern-
ment in matters relating to international negotiations where the
competitive position of American carriers might be adversely
affected. Section 4318 throws a mantle of protection around cer-
tain eligible air carrier employees who might be adversely affected
by the increased competition caused by the Act. Finally, the Act
provides for a plethora of reports and studies!" which are geared
to examining the effects of and anticipating the sunset provisions
of the legislation, which if successful, will result in the disappear-
ance of both the CAB and most of its current authority and the
2'4The Act 5 34, 92 Stat. 1740 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
1461 (a)).
215 The Act S 31, 92 Stat. 1731 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §
1386(b)(1)).
21'The Act § 20, 92 Stat. 1721 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S
1371(q)).
:17The Act § 30, 92 Stat. 1743 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1504).
"The Act § 43, 92 Stat. 1750 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1552).
"' The Act S 40(c), 92 Stat. 1745 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S
1551(c)). Most important of these is the report the Board must send to Congress
by January 1, 1984, reviewing its implementation of the Act and recommending
whether it should be allowed to go out of existence on January 1, 1985. Id.
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transfer of those vestiges of power which remain to the Depart-
ments of Transportation, Justice and the Postal Service as of
January 1, 1985.
II. OTHER PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Bill
A number of bills aimed at assisting aircraft and airport opera-
tors meet recent noise standards were introduced during the Ninety-
Fifth Congress. ' " Although the proposals were generally similar
in approach, at least one issue, financial assistance for retrofit and
replacement of older aircraft, caused considerable headaches for
its proponents.!1 This controversy, however, was overshadowed,
along with virtually all other aviation matters, by congressional
preoccupation with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,"' and
never seriously approached resolution. As this article is being
written, at least one congressional subcommittee is preparing a
new version of this legislation which will be introduced early in
the Ninety-Sixth Congress. Available information indicates that
the provision for financial assistance for retrofit and replacement
of aircraft has been deleted. Other than this change, the bill under
preparation is expected to follow previous proposals relating to
recent noise standards, as well as safety matters."
220H.R. 8729, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 747, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977); S. 3064, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); and S. 3279, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
"'See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., February 13, 1978, at 32; June 5, 1978,
at 35; June 19, 1978, at 38; and October 23, 1978, at 29-30.
2 See note 145 supra. See also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., October 23, 1978,
at 29-30.
223 Since this article was originally drafted, both Houses have prepared new
versions of this legislation which were introduced early in the 96th Congress.
Although substantially similar, the House version, H.R. 2458, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979), does not provide financial assistance to the aircraft operators
while the Senate bill, S. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), authorizes the imposi-
tion of both a "Domestic" and "International Noise Abatement Charge," the
proceeds of which may only be utilized to bring an operator's fleet into compli-
ance with federal noise abatement. Both bills would require compliance
with such regulations by both domestic and foreign operators. The more
lenient version was approved by the Senate in early May, but formal action by
the House and the certain need for Conference Committee resolution will no
doubt delay final enactment until later in the first session. See Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., May 7, 1979, at 27.
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Although several bills were introduced, ' the earlier proposed
H.R. 8729'" is representative and serves to illustrate the general
scheme the Ninety-Sixth Congress is likely to consider. The major
provision of H.R. 8729 which is likely to survive or be revived
during the next session is a new program to reduce existing non-
compatible land uses and prevent such future compatibility prob-
lems around airports. Efforts in this area are directed at assist-
ing airport operators and the surrounding communities. The bill
would require establishment by regulation of uniform systems for
measuring noise levels in and around airports, a determination of
the impact of such noise on individuals, and the identification of
land uses compatible with various levels of airport noise. The air-
port operators are supposedly encouraged to participate openly
and honestly in this program by precluding the introduction of
any list of compatible uses or noise maps as evidence in any court
in the United States.' This provision would also preclude an ac-
tion for damages attributable to such noise for property acquired
after the bill's enactment unless, in addition to other elements of
a prima facie damage action, the plaintiff could demonstrate a
significant change in airport operations occurring after the date
of acquisition.
H.R. 8729 or its successor would also increase funding under
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970'" as well as pro-
vide for federal grants to assist airport operators and local gov-
ernments in implementing programs approved by the Secretary of
Transportation which are directed at improving airport noise com-
patibility with land uses in the surrounding impacted areas. Addi-
tional funds would also be provided for research and development
activity in this area. Depending on the mood of Congress, it is
not inconceivable that we might see resurrected the proposal to
assist aircraft operators in meeting reduced noise standards by
n4See note 220 supra. See also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 5, 1978,
at 35.
1195th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
226 This protection is merely illusory since the wording of section 106 of the
proposed bill would not prevent discovery of such studies under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but merely prevent their use as evidence. Once the items
were produced pursuant to a Request to Produce under FED. R. Civ. P. 34,
the cat would be out of the bag and usable evidence easily developed.
22749 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1976).
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creating a fund through a series of surcharges on the flying public
from which the operator could draw in order to retrofit or replace
present equipment. This provision, however, which was present
in several proposed bills introduced during the last session, has
become highly politicized and most probably will become a vic-
tim of the compromise needed to keep the basic assistance program
alive."'
B. Bill to Combat International Terrorism
International, as opposed to domestic, terrorism is one of those
subjects generally beyond the power of any one nation to affect,
but upon which most legislatures, especially our own, feel com-
pelled to act. H.R. 13387' was one of the most recent such pro-
posals and was favorably reported out of the House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation late in the second session
of the Ninety-Fifth Congress. As was the case with virtually every
other piece of comprehensive legislation affecting the aviation in-
dustry proposed during the last session, it was overshadowed by
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.'
The purpose of H.R. 13387 was to provide a method through
which the United States could more effectively influence other
countries to improve anti-terrorist measures at their own airports
and hence better protect United States citizens traveling abroad.
To this end, it would have required the President to make semi-
annual reports to Congress on terrorist activities with special re-
ports on any such incidents which involved United States citizens
or property. The anti-terrorism bill would also have required the
President to send Congress a list of all states which demonstrated
a pattern of support for international terrorists. Appearing on
the list would trigger automatic economic sanctions, primarily
21 Aside from such basic questions as who should finance or bear the burden
of new equipment needed to muffle the airliners, even some of the bill's supporters
questioned this provision in view of the fact that it would have assisted the Euro-
pean A-300B airbus, which at present has no comparably quiet domestic com-
petitor, in penetrating the American market. H.R. REP. No. 836, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 39-40 (additional views of Sen. Goldwater to H.R. 8729 (1978)). See
also note 221 supra.
29 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter referred to alternatively as "H.R.
13387" or the "anti-terrorism bill"].
2" See note 145 supra. See also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., October 23, 1978,
at 29-30.
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intended to deny such countries our military and technical assist-
ance, as well as foreign aid."'
In addition to this psychological and economic pressure on the
aiders and abettors of international terrorism, H.R. 13387 would
have required the Secretary of Transportation to assess security
measures at foreign airports"' serving points in the United States
and publish in the Federal Register the names of airports which
fail to correct noted deficiencies. The Secretary would be similarly
required to take the more effective and embarrassing action of
posting the names of the delinquents in all United States airports.
Certain permissive authority was also included which would have
allowed the Secretary to effect the operating authority of air car-
riers operating between the deficient airport and the United States
but only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The carrot
accompanying this stick would be additional authority for the
Secretary of Transportation to provide assistance, beyond that now
provided by the Federal Aviation Administration, to foreign gov-
ernments to promote international aviation security.
The legislative history of H.R. 13387' reviews briefly the exist-
ing international conventions addressing the terrorist problem,
including the Hague Hijacking" and the Montreal Sabotage Con-
ventions,' and takes special note of the Anti-hijacking Declara-
tion reached at the Bonn Summit Conference on July 17, 1978.'
In addition to the expected call for intensified action to combat
international terrorism and a request for other governments to
join them in this effort, the Bonn declarants resolved to take
immediate action to terminate all flights between their respective
31 The President could suspend such sanctions for national security reasons
which must, however, be explained in a written report to Congress. See note 229
supra.
"' This is considerably broader than requirements laid on individual carriers
serving the United States market.
.- H.R. REP. No. 1801, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). [hereinafter referred
to as the "House Report"].
2" The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192 (1973).
3' The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aircraft, 24 U.S.T. 546, T.I.A.S. 7570.
23 6H.R. REP. No. 1801, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978). The seven coun-
tries which joined in the declaration (Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) account for more than
fifty percent of the free world aircraft operations. Id.
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countries and any state which refused to extradite or prosecute
hijackers and return the hijacked aircraft. The House Report
takes pleasure in noting that implementing legislation is not needed
to satisfy this resolve since the President was vested with such
authority as early as the Anti-hijacking Act of 1974."'
IV. THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
In a similar vein, Congress' preoccupation with the Panama
Canal Treaties and more recently the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) has resulted in what appears to be an almost
indefinite postponement in its consideration of the amendments to
the Warsaw Convention" embodied in the Guatemala City Proto-
col of 1971"' as now incorporated in the Montreal Protocols of
1975.20 The Protocols, which were submitted to the Senate for ad-
vice and consent in January of 1977, would increase the liability
limitations of the present convention in exchange for elimination
of all rights of action against an international air carrier, including
claims based upon wilful misconduct. To sweeten the proposal
for the Senate, the Air Traffic Association of America proposed
a supplemental compensation plan which would provide additional
compensation for United States passengers or passengers pur-
chasing their tickets in the United States. This plan was approved
by the CAB in July of 1977, but is now again under staff review
following a petition for reconsideration filed by the Aviation
Consumer Action Project and joined in by the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America.
Although the Panama Canal debate would probably have pre-
cluded consideration in any event, serious questions were raised
in the Senate regarding the acceptability of the economic trade-
offs embodied in the Protocols, their effect on, or abrogation of,
traditional common-law tort principles and the appropriateness
of approving them at a time when the supplemental compensation
plan, which the Senate viewed as inextricably tied to the Protocols,
was being challenged by consumer and other interested and affected
-749 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (1976).
21 T.S. No. 876, 49 Stat. 3000.
ICAO DOCUMENT No. 8932/2 (2d ed., authenticated text in the Russian
language as approved by Council, 1975).
m ICAO DOCUMENT Nos. 9145-9148 (1975).
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groups."' In view of the fact that the Senate will soon be taking
up such "page one" issues as the change in our China policy and
the new SALT agreement, it is doubtful that the Protocols will
be considered for some time.
"I See letter from Senators Richard Stone (D-Fla.) and James Pearson
(R-Kan.) to Honorable John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Mar. 6, 1978.
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